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A FEW INCONVENIENT TRUTHS ABOUT 
MICHAEL CRICHTON’S STATE OF FEAR: 
LAWYERS, CAUSES AND SCIENCE 
 
Lea B. Vaughn 
―Art rediscovers, generation by generation, what is 
necessary to humanness.‖ 
 
John Gardner, On Moral Fiction1 
 
―It ain‘t what you don‘t know that gets you into trouble.  
It‘s what you know for sure that just ain‘t so.‖ 
 
Mark Twain 
Cited in 
Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth2 
 
Although Crichton has lost the battle regarding global 
warming, his characterization of lawyers and law practice 
remains unchallenged.  This article challenges his damning 
portrait of lawyers as know-nothing, self-aggrandizing 
manipulators of various social and environmental causes.  A 
more nuanced examination of “cause lawyering” reveals that 
lawyers are not part of a vast conspiracy to grab power 
through the causes for which many work; in fact, the rules of 
professional responsibility as well as the structure of “cause 
lawyering” limit their power and influence.  Regardless, 
lawyers are nonetheless vital, and generally principled, 
participants in the debates and causes that inform 
environmental (and other scientific) policy-making in a 
 
 Professor of Law, University of Washington. A.B., 1975, Princeton University; J.D., 
1978, University of Michigan. Support for this article was provided by the University of 
Washington Law School Foundation as well as funding for a sabbatical provided by the 
University of Washington and the University of Washington School of Law. 
 1. JOHN GARDNER, ON MORAL FICTION, 6 (Basic Books 2000) (1978). 
 2. AL GORE, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH, 21 (Rodale Books 2006). 
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INTRODUCTION 
State of Fear,3 Michael Crichton‘s controversial and very 
ponderous novel, is about global warming. More accurately, 
the novel is a foil for Crichton‘s argument that the 
assumption that global warming exists and has been caused 
by human behaviors is questionable, at best.  This article, on 
the other hand, is about lawyers; global warming is 
secondary.  How are they connected?  In this techno-thriller, 
the plot is advanced through the actions of four characters, all 
lawyers.  Each character illustrates different visions of legal 
practice that are the focus of this article.  
A well-known writer of techno-thrillers that frequently 
become movies, and the creator of ER4, Crichton was more 
than an author.  Prior to beginning his writing career, 
 
 3. MICHAEL CRICHTON, STATE OF FEAR (Harper Collins 2004) [hereinafter 
CRICHTON, FEAR]. 
 4. ER (NBC 1994-2009). 
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Crichton was educated as a doctor,5 and was comfortable in 
the world of science.  The general focus of his œuvre has been 
man‘s hubris in believing that he can control nature through 
the use of scientific knowledge. Until State of Fear, the focus 
of his numerous books and movies had largely been on 
scientists, and science gone amok.6  But in this book, he 
turned his attention to how the combination of law, science 
and media influence public opinion and policy initiatives on 
global warming.7  What he found there was not to his liking.   
Crichton‘s influence on popular culture and related 
political debates is not a trivial matter.  For over twenty 
years, Crichton‘s novels and commentary have shaped 
American public opinion on topics as diverse as genetic 
engineering, sexual harassment, and medical practice.8  
Everyone who saw or read Jurassic Park9 imbibed the 
dangers of entrepreneurial science.  Crichton was helpful to 
former President Bush in shaping his message that the 
danger of climate change was exaggerated.10  For a writer of 
―thrillers,‖ Crichton, who had also testified before Congress,11 
 
 5. See Crichton Biography, http://www.crichton-
official.com/aboutmc/biography.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). Crichton posted this 
biography at his website: Born in Chicago, Illinois, October 23, 1942. Educated at 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, A.B. (summa cum laude) 1964 (Phi 
Beta Kappa). Henry Russell Shaw Traveling Fellow, 1964-65. Visiting Lecturer in 
Anthropology at Cambridge University, England, 1965. Graduated Harvard Medical 
School, M.D. 1969; post-doctoral fellow at the Salk Institute for Biological Sciences, La 
Jolla, California 1969-1970. Visiting Writer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1988;  Cf. Crichton Biography, http://www.crichton-official.com/aboutmichaelcrichton-
inmemoriam.html (last visited Aug. 7,  2009) (Crichton died on Nov. 4, 2008); Cf. 
Crichton Biography, http://www.crichton-official.com/books.html (last visited  Aug. 9, 
2009). His website is being maintained posthumously, and two books will be published 
after this death.  State of Fear, however, was his penultimate book during his lifetime.  
 6. See e.g. MICHAEL CRICHTON, PREY (Harper 2002); MICHAEL CRICHTON, 
JURASSIC PARK (Ballantine Books 1990) [herinafter CRICHTON, JURASSIC];  MICHAEL 
CRICHTON, THE ANDROMEDA STRAIN  (Knopf 1969). 
 7. See CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 572. 
 8. See supra note 6; See also MICHAEL CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE (Ballantine Books 
1994) [herinafter CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE]; ER (NBC 1994-2009); MICHAEL CRICHTON, 
FIVE PATIENTS (Arrow Books Ltd 1970). 
 9. CRICHTON, JURASSIC, supra note 6; JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993).  
 10. Cf. ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE, 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 197 (Bloomsbury 2006) (―A few weeks later, it was revealed that 
the president had turned to Michael Crichton, whose thriller State of Fear portrays 
climate change as fiction invented by environmentalists, for advice on how to deal with 
the issue.  Bush and Crichton reportedly ‗talked for an hour and were in near-total 
agreement.‘‖). 
 11. See infra note 19. 
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had amassed incredible influence as the voice of science and 
reason. 
Although Crichton had written about lawyers,12 State of 
Fear represents his longest exposition, through the characters 
of three lawyers, on the effect that lawyers have on science, 
science policy, and public opinion.13  This article focuses on 
the claims Crichton makes about lawyers through these 
characters.  The three lawyers through which he makes his 
claim are Peter Evans, an associate at a Los Angeles law firm; 
Nicholas Drake, a former litigator now head of National 
Environmental Research Fund (NERF); and Richard Kenner, 
a man of action who holds both a J.D. and a Ph.D.14   
Through these characters, Crichton makes claims about 
lawyers, and lawyering.  The characters express models of 
legal behavior as lawyers mediate the discussions a 
democratic society must hold regarding science, policy and 
law.  First, he claims that lawyers know nothing about 
science or the scientific method, nor are they inclined to learn 
anything about it.  The implication is that, given a lawyer‘s 
central role in policy-making and litigation about science, this 
is dangerous to society.  In his view, truth is held hostage to 
dispute resolution because of the adversary tradition.15  
Second, some public interest organizations, here illustrated 
by NERF, have been captured by lawyers to be run as 
platforms for pursuing socially disruptive litigation. This use 
of lawyers in the novel suggests that matters are pursued, 
regardless of its merit, for the sheer enjoyment litigation, 
rather than to promote the cause itself.16  Finally, lawyers, 
aided by politicians and the media, are complicit in creating 
the ―state of fear‖ from which the book takes its title.17  This 
has promoted a ―near-hysterical preoccupation with safety,‖ 
 
 12. See CRICHTON, JURASSIC, supra note 6 (The lawyer here is portrayed as a risk 
averse character whose job it is to ensure the safe profitability of Jurassic Park.  
Although the scene does not appear in the book, most movie goers cheered when the 
lawyer was plucked off of a toilet and eaten by a tyrannosaurus rex); See also 
CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE, supra note 8 (Male executive retains a lawyer to fight 
allegations of sexual harassment). 
 13. See CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3. 
 14. Jennifer Haynes, a lawyer who infiltrates the NERF litigation staff and is niece 
to Kenner, plays a minor role here.  Crichton tends not to develop female characters in 
his novels, and the same is true here. 
 15. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 92-93. 
 16. Id. at 128. 
 17. Id. at 454-456. 
VAUGHN_FORMATTED 2/15/2010  10:40 AM 
2010] A Few Inconvenient Truths 53 
and the state uses this ―fear‖ to exert social control.18 
Crichton does not advance these claims lightly.  As a quick 
perusal of his website suggests, these claims were his 
personal cause.19  Taking the claims seriously, this essay asks 
whether each claim is true; if it is not true, then what is the 
correct account, and finally, what should be done after 
analyzing these claims.  Although made in the guise of a 
novel, these claims are taken, and should be taken, 
seriously.20  As we have moved from a common-law tradition 
to a regulatory state, lawyers‘ involvement in both the design 
of policy and challenges to it has grown exponentially.  Many 
of these policies are based on scientific findings.  Questions 
about science and its impact are raised in courts, legislatures 
and administrative agencies.21 The quality or soundness of the 
relationship between law and science profoundly affects the 
legitimacy of the legal enterprise in a knowledge-based 
democratic society.  This novel raises important issues about 
the role of law and lawyers in debates about social policy and 
risk in a deliberative democracy.22 
 
 18. Id.  
 19. Crichton had an official website: http://www.crichton-official.com/.  He had 
given several speeches on this topic: e.g., Michael Crichton, Speech at the Washington 
Center for Complexity and Public Policy: Complexity Theory and Environmental 
Management (Nov. 6, 2005) (available at http://www.crichton-official.com/speech-
complexity.html); Michael Crichton, Testimony Before the United States Senate, 
Committee on Environment and Public Works (September 28, 2005) (transcript 
available at http://www.crichton-official.com/speech-senatetestimony.html); and 
Michael Crichton, Speech before the Joint Session AEI-Brookings Institution: Science 
Policy in the 21st Century (January 25, 2005) (available at http://www.crichton-
official.com/speech-sciencepolicy.html).  
 20. State of Fear  was widely reviewed, although largely in reference to its claims 
about global warming.  See, e.g., Michiko Kakutani, Beware! Tree-Huggers Plot Evil to 
Save World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/13/books/13kaku.html?ex=1159675200&en=6492b2e9
b274af9c&ei=5070.  On the other hand, at least one reviewer stated that the book 
should be taken seriously: ―The whole scenario is outlandish even by Crichtonian 
standards, but, when you think about it, there really isn‘t much choice.  What State of 
Fear demonstrates is how hard it is to construct a narrative that would actually justify 
current American policy.  In this way, albeit unintentionally, Crichton has written a 
book that deserves to be taken seriously.‖ Elizabeth Kolbert, Getting Warmer, NEW 
YORKER, Jan. 3, 2005, at 22. 
 21. See e.g., ROGER A. PIELKE, THE HONEST BROKER: MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE IN 
POLICY AND POLITICS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). 
 22. See Anthony Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media 
Portrayals of American Attorneys, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 281 (1986) (After noting 
that lawyers are ―America‘s preeminently political profession,‖ Chase states: ―[V]ery 
little has been written (by lawyers, law professors, or social scientists) on the images 
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After outlining the plot of the novel, this article will fully 
describe the three claims that Crichton makes about lawyers.  
Following each claim will be a response considering whether 
the claim accurately describes lawyers and legal practice.  
Each response will center on one or two voices in the scholarly 
community that have focused on the issues raised by each 
claim.23  While there are obviously many other sources of 
criticism, my goal here is to expose counterpoints to each of 
Crichton‘s claims.24 
I. THE NOVEL 
The plot covers a six-month period of time, roughly from 
May through October 2004, during which NERF secretly 
masterminds a plot to manufacture planetary disasters that 
will be attributed to global warming and severe climate 
change, thus enhancing NERF‘s credibility as a cause-based 
organization.25  This greater prominence will lead to increased 
donations to fund its environmental litigation efforts, 
specifically a lawsuit that has been initiated on behalf of 
Vanutu, a small Pacific Island that will be inundated as 
global warming causes ocean levels to rise.26  A small group of 
people foil this plan when they uncover the truth about 
NERF‘s involvement in creating disasters to improve its 
image.27  The author uses this plot to discredit current global 
warming theories and environmental groups, using footnotes 
and charts to supplement the narrative. 28   
 
that Americans have constructed of law and lawyers as mediated through the 
institutions of mass culture.‖).  
 23. See Part II infra.  
 24. This essay does not attempt to refute Crichton‘s views on global warming.  
Alternate, and far more accurate, accounts of the problem are available in scientific and 
popular literature.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, The Climate of Man (parts  I, II & III), 
NEW YORKER, Apr. 25, 2005, at 56, THE NEW YORKER, May 2, 2005, at 64, NEW 
YORKER, May 9, 2005, at 52)  (These articles were collected into Kolbert‘s book length 
treatment in  FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE, supra note  10).  A summary of the 
scientific theory and legal initiatives undertaken appears in Kristin Choo, Feeling the 
Heat: The Growing Debate Over Climate Change Takes on Legal Overtones, 92 A.B.A. J. 
28 (2006);  See also MARK LYNAS, SIX DEGREES: OUR FUTURE ON A HOTTER PLANET 
(National Geographic Society 2008) (This book graphically demonstrates the 
consequences of global warming at one degree centigrade intervals). 
 25. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. It is likely that Crichton was fictionalizing the plight of the Pacific Island 
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As noted previously, the plot is driven through the actions 
of three characters: Peter Evans, Nicolas Drake, and Richard 
Kenner.  As one reviewer noted, ―the characters in this novel 
practically come with Post-it notes on their foreheads 
indicating whether they are good guys or bad guys.‖29  Briefly 
sketched, twenty-eight year old Peter Evans,30 the every-
lawyer, is a junior associate at the Los Angeles firm of Hassle 
and Black, where he apparently exclusively conducts pro bono 
litigation in this otherwise corporate firm.  Ultimately, he 
must choose to align himself with either the ―bad‖ lawyer or 
the ―good‖ one.  In contrast, Nicholas Drake, the ―bad‖ lawyer, 
has been director of NERF for ten years, after retiring from a 
―highly successful‖ career as a litigator.31  Drake is portrayed 
as a ―drama queen‖ for whom everything is a crisis, important 
and urgent.32  Richard Kenner, the ―good‖ lawyer, is 
introduced as a man of action, almost spy-like in his ability to 
obtain information and thwart obstacles in his path.33  He has 
a J.D. from Harvard, and a Ph.D. in civil engineering from 
M.I.T.34  Although obviously the scientific issue driving the 
plot, global warming also becomes the stage on which the 
three characters  make claims not only about the veracity of 
global warming, but also about the utility of lawyering. 
 
people of the Carteret Islands, a chain of islands northeast of Papua New Guinea.  
―[S]ea levels have risen so much that during the annual king tide season, November to 
March, the roiling ocean blocks he view from one island to the next, and residents stash 
their possessions in fishing nets strung between the palm trees.‖  Neil MacFarquahr, 
Refugees Join List of Climate-Change Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A4, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/world/29refugees.html.  Thus, 
Crichton‘s fictionalized dilemma is actually devastatingly real.  Island people have 
sought a United Nations resolution linking climate change, mass population migration 
and national security issues. Typically most climate change debate has been focused on 
the science rather than international peace and security issues that arise from mass 
population migration and food shortages.  The human rights aspect of climate change 
was addressed at a The Law of Climate Change and Human Rights Conference: Three 
Degrees, the University of Washington School of Law, available at 
http://www.threedegreesconference.org/ (last visited  Aug. 10, 2009) (which is being 
maintained post-conference for further developments.). 
 29. Kakutani, supra note 20. 
 30. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 40. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 161. 
 33. Id. at 31. 
 34. Id. at 56. 
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II. THE CLAIMS ANALYZED 
A.  Lawyers Willfully Lack knowledge of Science to the 
Detriment of Policy-making. 
1. The Claim 
One of Crichton‘s claims is that lawyers have no 
knowledge of science.  In fact, he claims they are proud of 
being scientific ―know-nothings‖ who at times, enabled by the 
adversary system, willfully distort it.35  Given a lawyer‘s key 
role in shaping science policy, in Crichton‘s world this is a 
grievous sin. He makes this point through the characters of 
Peter Evans and Nicholas Drake, and in observations about 
the adversary system.  This matters because ―we‘re in the 
middle of a war – a global war of information versus 
disinformation‖ fought on various battlegrounds: ―Newspaper 
op-eds. Television reports. Scientific journals. Websites, 
conferences, classrooms – and courtrooms, too, if it comes to 
that.‖36  
From the beginning, lawyers are portrayed as people who, 
in contrast to scientists, use facts instrumentally.  This is 
illustrated in an exchange between Drake and a scientist, 
witnessed by Evans, whose work has been sponsored by 
NERF.37  The scientist‘s data shows that Iceland has become 
colder, and its glaciers have been advancing.38  Drake tries to 
persuade the scientist to change the explanation of the data 
in a way that the scientist feels ―twists truth.‖39  Drake insists 
that the corporate disinformation campaigns will seize upon 
this fact to the implied detriment of environmental groups.  
The scientist replies, ―[h]ow the information is used is not my 
concern.  My concern is to report the truth as best I can.‖  
 
 35. Id. at 44, 94,187. 
 36. Id. at 48. 
 37. Id. at 23. 
 38. Id. at 43.  A footnote at the bottom of the page accompanies the character 
dialogue: ―*P. Chylek, et al. 2004, ‗Global warming and the Greenland ice sheet,‘ 
Climatic Change 63, 201-21. ‗Since 1940 . . . data have undergone predominantly a 
cooling trend. . . . The Greenland ice sheet and coastal regions are not following the 
current global warming trend.‘‖  At the very beginning of the novel, Crichton has placed 
a note that states: ―This is a work of fiction. . . .However, references to real people, 
institutions, and organizations that are documented in footnotes are accurate. 
Footnotes are real.‖  Id. at vii. 
 39. Id. 
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―‗Very noble,‘ Drake said. ‗Perhaps not so practical.‘‖40   
Peter Evans later confirms that lawyers have this view of 
truth and truth telling.  When discussing the likelihood of 
opposing scientific evidence in the Vanutu case, Evans 
reflects that ―[o]ne of the first things you learned in law school 
was that the law was not about truth.  It was about dispute 
resolution.  In the course of resolving a dispute, the truth 
might or might not emerge.  Often it did not. . . . It happened 
all the time.‖41  This likely leads to Crichton‘s conclusion, in 
his ―Author‘s Note,‖ that complex system management and 
policy-making should not be done through litigation, but 
rather through the political process.42 
But even more appalling for Crichton is the typical 
lawyer‘s lack of, if not outright disdain for, scientific 
knowledge.  Principally through Evans, and to a lesser extent 
Drake, the novel is a virtual acid rain of a lawyer‘s contempt 
for scientific knowledge.  From the beginning, Evans is so 
scientifically inept that he does not understand why NERF is 
funding so many scientific experts for the Vanutu case until 
Jennifer Haynes, one of the NERF Vanutu litigators, points 
out that the focus on data is central to the litigation ―because 
we‘re trying to win the case.‖43 Evans needed to be reminded 
that in the adversary system, data can be used 
instrumentally to persuade the fact finder of the ―truth‖ of the 
legal claim in order to win at trial.   
On numerous occasions, Evans is depicted as willfully 
ignorant of science.  Although responsible for assessing the 
Vanutu litigation for his client, George Morton, Evans does 
not understand the sea level measurement formula crucial to 
the litigation.44  Later, Evans, an environmental lawyer, 
admits that he is ―clueless‖ about science and that the 
complexity of it gives him a headache.45  As he falls under the 
influence of Kenner, Kenner must take pains to explain 
simple science ideas to Evans such as the notion of a standing 
 
 40. Id. at 44. 
 41. Id. at 92-93. 
 42. See Id. at 572. 
 43. Id. at 79. 
 44. Id. at 95. 
 45. Id. at 187-188.  This is in contrast to most environmental lawyers in my 
acquaintance, many of whom have become knowledgeable about the scientific basis of 
global warming and other environmental problems.  
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wave, or the significance of error terms in scientific research.46  
As Crichton concludes, when Evans narrowly saves himself 
from a lightning strike, ―[h]e didn‘t know any science, but 
assumed it must be something metallic or electronic.‖47  Evans 
is similarly unable to distinguish between good science and 
bad science, and therefore is not troubled by the anomalies 
between different data sets and their implications for 
litigation or other legal pursuits.48  Ultimately, however, 
under the careful and patient tutelage of Kenner, Evans is 
redeemed and comes to appreciate science.49 
Drake, one of the founding heads of NERF, is equally 
bereft of scientific knowledge: ―[H]e had no science 
background at all.‖50  Crichton‘s message is that this lack of 
background, combined with the norms of the adversary 
tradition, means that lawyers have absolutely no scruples 
about distorting scientific truth. 
2. Another View 
On this claim, Crichton does have a valid point.  Many 
lawyers are woefully ignorant of science, statistics and the 
methods of each discipline.  This can be especially 
 
 46. Id. at 210, 247;  See also id. at 248, 313, 406.  There is also a subtextual 
argument that lawyers‘ indifference to science and their commitment to orderly dispute 
resolution make them wimps.  Kenner chides Evans on several occasions for being 
afraid to use physical force.  He chides Evans for being reluctant about fighting back, 
and Evans replies, ―[m]aybe so, but I‘m a lawyer.‖ Id. at 261.  Later, Evans thinks, 
―[j]ust because I don‘t shoot guns . . . I‘m a lawyer, for Christ‘s sake.‖ Id. at 323.  Under 
the tutelage of Kenner on both science and manliness, Evans overcomes his reluctance 
to resort to violence, and is then seen as more confident, older, and more mature, 
particularly by the women around him.  Id. at 357-359.  This also underscores a 
message that Crichton is trying to make about civilization versus the state of nature. 
Nature is not something admirable in Crichton‘s view; rather, civilization saves us from 
nature be it cannibals or rampaging dinosaurs or tiny microbes. Id. at 527. ―You think 
civilization is some horrible, polluting human invention that separates us from the 
state of nature.  But civilization doesn‘t separate us from nature, Ted.  Civilization 
protects us from nature.  Because what you see right now, all around you [cannibals]—
this is nature.‖ Id. 
 47. Id. at 336. 
 48. See id. at 84-90, 247-248. 
 49. For example, Kenner patiently provides Evans with references on global 
warming in a successful effort to ―turn‖ him to the anti-global warming side. Id. at 193 
(It is through this device that Crichton is able to introduce a number of charts, studies 
and footnotes into the plotline). 
 50. Id.  at 127. 
 
VAUGHN_FORMATTED 2/15/2010  10:40 AM 
2010] A Few Inconvenient Truths 59 
troublesome because ―[s]cience provides many of the 
assumptions that underlie most environmental laws and is 
frequently used by policy-makers to justify decision-making.  
Often, science is used support various claims, counter-claims 
and assumptions about the environment.‖51 
This is paradoxical because, since the time of Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, the father of the modern law school 
curriculum, and the formalists, law has attempted to ground 
itself in science and to imitate it: 
[A]ll the available materials of that science [that is, law] are 
contained in printed books. . .  [T]he library is . . . to us all that the 
laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, all 
that the museum of natural history is to the zoologists, . . . .52 
For these early legal theorists, hitching law‘s star to the 
scientific wagon was a way to argue for the logic and 
endurance of law.  For law, a discipline that meddles so much 
in human affairs, it was a way to suggest some certainty and 
objectivity in its pronouncements.  The law school became the 
center of legal research, which went hand-in-hand with the 
development of legal elites.53  Although the focus of law has 
shifted to the social sciences, this attraction to scientific 
method has been a way in which law tries to assure its critics 
of its rationality and objectivity.  It is also a way of assuring 
that the predictions law must make, and the control that it 
has over human behavior, has some basis in reality.   
In his implicit critique, Crichton raises two objections.  
The first is that lawyers know little about science; the second 
is that, because the adversary system focuses more on dispute 
resolution than on truth, it does not partner well with science.  
Many lawyers do have a limited grounding in science, 
although there have been no empirical studies to confirm this.  
Professor Faigman, in his book Legal Alchemy: The Use and 
Misuse of Science in the Law,54 depicts lawyers and scientists 
as speaking two different languages.  He is an especially 
harsh critic of lawyers, noting that ―[m]any students who 
 
 51. John McEldowney, The Environment, Science, and Law, in 1 LAW AND 
SCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 109 (Helen Reece, ed., 1998). 
 52. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (Yale Univ. Press 1977). 
 53. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE, ch. 3 (Oxford University 
Press 1976); GILMORE, supra note 52, at ch. 3. 
 54. DAVID FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 
(W.H. Freeman and Company 2000) [hereinafter LEGAL ALCHEMY]. 
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have spent much of their educational life avoiding math and 
science become lawyers. . . . The average lawyer is not merely 
ignorant of science, he or she has an affirmative aversion to 
it.‖55   
As Faigman chronicles, while law and science (and 
religion), began as intellectual partners, with a concomitant 
admixture of the natural and the moral, their ways departed.  
In the course of his book, he makes two basic points about law 
and science, both of which are germane to Crichton‘s 
exposition.  First, Faigman pointedly paints lawyers as 
woefully ignorant of science and develops the ways in which 
this ignorance affects the three venues where law and science 
intersect: the courtroom, the legislature, and administrative 
agencies.56 For example, he points out that the Supreme 
Court‘s ―insecurity‖ in grappling with science has ―real costs‖ 
that cause the justices to avoid ―need analysis‖ because of its 
lack of comfort with science.57  Although the Court finally 
erected legal rules for the use of expert and scientific 
testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,58 
Faigman noted that many continue to doubt the ability of 
jurists as scientific gatekeepers.  However, he believes that 
most judges have the intellectual capacity to master the 
science that is presented in court proceedings.59  His goal is 
not to turn lawyers into scientists, but into ―good consumers 
of science,‖ noting that lawyers should have the ability ―to 
read research reports written by scientists.‖60 
 
 55. Id. at xi. 
 56. Id. at 49. 
 57. Id. at 26. 
 58. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In that case, the underlying substantive issue involved 
whether the maternal ingestion of the anti-nausea drug, Bendictin, caused birth 
defects.  The Court announced that the trial court judge must assure that admitted 
scientific ―evidence is not only relevant, but reliable.‖ Thus, judges are now tasked with 
the task of determining ―whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific 
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand of determine a fact in issue.  
This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.  We are confident that federal 
judges possess the capacity to under this review.‖ Id. at 592-93.  In their eyes, then, 
―good‖ or legally relevant science will be testable, ordinarily peer reviewed, have an 
ascertainable error rate, and find general acceptance in the scientific community.  Id. at 
593-95. 
 59. LEGAL ALCHEMY, supra note 54, at 64. 
 60. Id. at 199.  In fact, he ultimately suggests that this may be a constitutionally 
imposed duty: ―The Constitution imparts an affirmative obligation on lawmakers to act 
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That said, Faigman is also very clear that scientific 
outcomes should not determine the underlying value, legal or 
policy decisions; in fact the opposite is true.  He is clear that 
law, for principled reasons, might choose to ignore scientific 
principles in setting policy,61 but that would be, presumably, 
only after understanding the science and its applicability to 
the issue at hand.  This is because the disciplines of law and 
science have two different tasks: science studies what is; law, 
what ought to be 62 (although this is not to say that the tasks 
are unrelated).63 
B. Cause-Lawyering is Dangerous to the Policy-making and 
Political Process. 
1. The Claim 
It is bad enough in Crichton‘s view that lawyers are 
cheerfully ignorant of science, but when this ignorance is 
married to public interest group litigation and pro bono 
lawyering, it becomes dangerous.  Through the characters of 
Drake and Evans, Crichton claims that public interest 
lawyering64 is, for all intents and purposes, not in the public 
interest.  He views environmental organizations as shells or 
covers for litigators to play out policy dramas that would be 
better resolved by scientists and Congress.   
Most of Crichton‘s ire is aimed at litigation-driven public 
interest organizations, and the epitome of the form is 
captured in the character of Nicolas Drake, an ill-informed 
and self-aggrandizing character.  Drake, formerly a successful 
litigator, left active practice to become the director of NERF, a 
position that he held for ten years.65  The organization Drake 
directs represents the island of Vanutu in the global warming 
 
rationally in carrying out their public duties.  This means necessarily that they should 
have some facility with science and the scientific method.‖ Id. at 202. 
 61. Id. at 11.  
 62. Id. at 6.  
 63. He describes law as operating in the world of policy, but it needs to know facts, 
established by science, in order to operate in that world of policy. Id. at 26. 
 64. Crichton does not attach a particular conceptual label to the environmental 
lawyers he depicts in his book.  In this paper, the term ―cause lawyering,‖ rather than 
public interest advocacy/lawyering, will be used to describe this form of legal practice 
and advocacy. 
 65. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 40. 
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litigation that is a centerpiece of the plot.66 While the lawsuit 
itself is ostensibly important to Drake, he is also concerned 
that it generate publicity. In fact, the publicity surrounding 
the lawsuit becomes more important than the suit itself.67 
Crichton‘s condemnation of this model of cause lawyering 
comes to a head when a disenchanted supporter condemns the 
organization and the litigation, concluding that the money 
would be better spent on research:  
I said before that we don‘t know enough.  But I fear that today, the 
watchword of NERF has become, we don‘t sue enough. . . . NERF is 
a law firm.  I don‘t know if you realize that.  It was started by 
lawyers and it is run by lawyers.  But I now believe money is better 
spent on research than litigation.  And that is why I‘m withdrawing 
[my funding of the Vanutu lawsuit].68 
Drake is outraged by this loss of support, noting that 
industry, NERF‘s opponent, is incredibly strong and ―will stop 
at nothing‖ to see that the lawsuit is foiled.69  In fact, it seems 
that the only thing that drives Drake is funding. Causes are 
nothing more to the character than a means of obtaining 
funds.70   
In this portrayal of cause lawyering, everything is 
subordinate to funding and publicity.  The lawyer appears to 
direct the setting of priorities, the choice of strategy, and is 
the ―brains‖ behind the operation.  That Drake is the 
originator of the highly illegal idea of causing severe climate 
change incidents to generate publicity and funding is 
consistent with the portrait of the character: a selfish, flighty 
person who has put litigation and publicity before any deep 
scientific understanding of the complexities of the underlying 
issue. 
The portrait of Peter Evans as a cause-lawyer is only 
 
 66. As Crichton notes, this litigation ―was never filed.‖  Id. at xi. The story is thus 
framed as an explanation of this failed piece of environmental litigation, somewhat in 
the form of an exposé. 
 67. Id. at 52, 392 (―You know as well as I do that the whole purpose of this case was 
to generate publicity They‘ve got their press conference There‘s no need to pursue it 
further.‖).  Crichton also suggests that environmental groups funnel funds to 
ecoterrorists. Id. at 182, 560 (that claim, however, is beyond the scope of this paper). 
 68. Id. at 129. 
 69. Id. at 159.  
 70. Drake argues that global warming does not scare people enough to generate 
donations the way that cancer-causing pollution can.  He needs a cause ―that works!‖ 
where works is measured by the amount of funds generated.  Id. at 295-96. 
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slightly more sympathetic. Perhaps this is because Evans 
eventually ―sees the light‖ and backs away from NERF and 
the Vanutu lawsuit while helping Kenner to foil Drake‘s plan 
of intentionally causing severe climate incidents.  Here, the 
sketch is less developed but Evans is drawn as someone who 
pursues cause lawyering at a major Los Angeles law firm 
described as ―forward-looking, socially aware.‖71  While his 
firm represents celebrities with environmental concerns, it 
also represents the three biggest land developers in Orange 
County.72  Evans‘s sole responsibility, however, is to represent 
George Morton and his environmental interests.73 As noted 
above, Evans is a cause-lawyer with absolutely no background 
knowledge in the science that forms the basis of the 
environmental and global warming concerns of his client base.  
Kenner berates Evans for his firm‘s client arrangements, 
accusing Evans of being a flunky for the environmental 
movement because environmental clients pay his salary and 
thus control his personal opinions.  When Evans objects to 
this characterization, Crichton, through the character of 
Kenner, replies, ―[n]ow you know how legitimate scientists 
feel when their integrity is impugned by slimy 
characterizations such as the one you just made‖ (where 
Evans suggested studies were biased by the industry paying 
for them).74   
In summary, cause-lawyering in this portrait is 
manipulative as well as instrumental.  In addition to self-
aggrandizement, the lawyers are driven by a pre-occupation 
with money and the publicity it can buy.  Lawsuits are filed 
only because they can generate publicity, not because they 
may actually address and remedy real social problems.  
Because of these barely hidden ulterior motives, cause 
lawyering and the resultant lawsuits, even if not pursued, are 
dangerous for making sound social and scientific policy.  This 
is especially the case because lawyers are part of the ―PLM,‖ 
or political-legal-media complex, that intentionally creates 
fear in the subject population.75  Crichton, in his final author‘s 
 
 71. Id. at 71. 
 72. Id..  This configuration of clients seems unlikely given professional conflict of 
interest rules.   
 73. Id.. 
 74. Id. at 195-96. 
 75. Id. at 456.   
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note, states: ―We need more scientists and many fewer 
lawyers. We cannot hope to manage a complex system such as 
the environment through litigation.‖76 
2. Another View 
Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold shine light on a far 
more nuanced view of cause lawyering.77  Although this type 
of practice has not received much scholarly attention,78 their 
body of work has been important in defining and describing 
exactly what cause lawyering is, how it emerged historically, 
and the role it plays in practice and in deliberative 
democracies.  As portrayed by these authors and their 
contributors to the edited volumes, cause lawyers attempt to 
eliminate the tension between personal values and beliefs, 
and the value systems of their clients.  In short, they reject 
the ―hired gun‖ stereotype of the lawyer.79  As depicted in the 
scholarly literature, Crichton‘s portrait of environmental 
lawyers is deeply flawed.  He has the analysis backwards: the 
lawyers do not drive the cause; rather, the cause drives the 
lawyers. 
From the three works of Austin Sarat and Stuart 
Scheingold, a definition of the cause lawyer emerges that is 
both rich and complex.  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in her 
contribution, faces head-on the question that Crichton never 
raises: ―Is the environmental defense lawyer in the U.S. 
 
 76. Id. at 572.  Crichton believes that ―resolution of conflicting claims‖ should be 
resolved through the political system. Id. 
 77. See e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Oxford University Press 1998) 
[hereinafter CAUSE LAWYERING]; AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, SOMETHING TO 
BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (Stanford University 
Press 2004) [hereinafter SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN]; AUSTIN SARAT & STUART 
SCHEINGOLD, THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL 
PRACTICE (Stanford University Press 2005) [hereinafter WORLDS]; A fourth and later 
book, THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS, focuses on depictions of various 
lawsuits and lawyers in the media. AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE 
CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008). 
 78. CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 38, 41, 45.  Similarly, in SOMETHING TO 
BELIEVE IN, the authors note that, because of the lack of scholarship, there is not a 
single valid definition.  SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 77, at 3.  They borrow, 
however, a definition proposed by David Luban, and state: ―At its core, cause lawyering 
is about using legal skills to pursue ends and ideals that transcend client service—be 
those ideals social, cultural, political, economic or, indeed, legal.‖ Id.  
 79. CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 3. 
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Department of Justice politically and morally equivalent to 
the environmental prosecutor in the same agency, much less 
lawyers representing the Sierra Club?‖80  What exactly, then, 
is a ―cause lawyer‖? 
For Menkel-Meadow, cause lawyering is ―any activity that 
seeks to use law-related means or seeks to change laws or 
regulations to achieve greater social justice—both for 
particular individuals (drawing on individualistic ‗helping‘ 
orientations) and for disadvantaged groups.‖81  She concludes, 
―the goals and the purposes of the legal actor are to ‗do good‘ – 
to seek a more just world – to do ‗lawyering for the good.‘‖82  
Sarat and Scheingold, while not disagreeing with Menkel-
Meadow, develop the definition further. They also see cause-
lawyers as ―political actors,‖ albeit actors ―whose work 
involves doing law.‖83  While cause lawyering does not 
―preclude mixed motives,‖ Sarat and Scheingold note that 
―political or moral commitment [is] an essential and 
distinguishing feature of cause lawyering.‖84  Because cause-
lawyers exist in a number of practice settings with varying 
levels of commitment, they are arrayed along a continuum 
that moves from something more than a conventional client-
servicing lawyer to a political activist, who, while law-trained, 
may no longer actively practice law.85  The authors note that 
the distinguishing factor of this type of practice may be the 
way in which law is reconnected to morality, and that the 
lawyer ―shares and aims to share with her client 
responsibility for the ends she is promoting in her 
representation.‖86 
 
 80. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an 
Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers,” in CAUSE 
LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 33; See also id. at 55 fn. 20 (for the list of sources she 
compiles). 
 81. Id. at 37. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and Conventional 
Lawyering: Professional and Political Perspectives, in SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra 
note 77, at 3.   
 84. Id. at 4. On the next page, they note that cause lawyering is often called public 
interest lawyering but they reject this label because cause lawyering is ―more inclusive‖ 
and does not implicitly distinguish between ―worthy and unworthy causes‖ nor is it 
necessarily associated with a reform agenda in a liberal political sense.  Id. at 5. 
 85. CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 7. 
 86. Id. at 3.  Continuing, they note that this raises problems for traditional notions 
of professional responsibility, and that the attention to altering some facet of the status 
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While attempting to change political relations, cause 
lawyering is in fact bounded by politics.  In their earliest 
work, Sarat and Scheingold observe that cause lawyering is 
affected by the type of political regime as well as ―by the 
prevailing legal tradition.‖87 In a system where law is 
autonomous, the combination of law and politics threatens the 
relationship between the two disciplines.  This combination 
suggests that, borrowing from E.P. Thompson, law is 
derivative of politics and is an ―arena of struggle‖ in which 
law challenges the dominant politics and culture.88  Menkel-
Meadow echoes this observation, noting that the organization 
of the state ―affects how cause lawyering is expressed‖ 
because legal rules define the permissible area and types of 
challenges to the system.89  This operation within and on the 
edges of the political community may historically be a 
dominant feature of cause lawyering.  As Menkel-Meadow 
states: 
The modern cause lawyer, then, is not unlike the lawyer of the 
‗mediating‘ class described by Tocqueville in the nineteenth 
century.  In addition to translating between classes, the cause 
lawyer seeks to work within the system, to use the law, either to 
change it or to hold it to its promises, but retaining a more abstract 
commitment to its symbols, regimes, and rules beyond the relief of 
individual pain.90 
In another study in Cause Lawyering, Professors McCann 
and Silverstein, after reviewing the classic portrait of the self-
interested, hired-gun lawyer, state that their ―research has 
not confirmed the standard critical view of legal activists‖ but 
rather has revealed that ―although cause lawyers in our study 
certainly did encourage the use of tactics associated with the 
 
quo ―transforms‖ the lawyer-client relationship so that ―[s]erving the client is but one 
component of serving the cause,‖ thus moving moral questions to the center of the 
relationship in contrast to the traditional model. Id. at 4. They reiterate this point in 
their article, The Dynamics of Cause Lawyering: Constraints and Opportunities, in 
WORLDS, supra note 77, at 1-3 (noting distinctiveness of this style of practice, 
encompassing lawyers who may work for a single cause or are ―less closely identified 
with any cause. . .,‖ this form of practice reconnects law and morality, and makes 
apparent that law is a ―public profession.‖). 
 87. CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 7. 
 88. Id. at 8-9.  This is not surprising since they assert that in common law 
traditions, the boundaries between ―law and politics tend to be readily permeable‖ with 
lawyers moving between different types of practice.  Id. at 6. 
 89. Id. at 35.  
 90. Id. at 47. 
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judicial system, they tended to be highly circumspect, critical, 
and strategically sophisticated about the pitfalls of legal 
action, the ‗liberal‘ biases of legal norms, and the imperatives 
of effective political struggle.‖91  They concluded, ―[a]ll in all, 
legal victories were hardly seen as ends in themselves by the 
lawyers we studied,‖ and that all of the studied lawyers 
―noted the ethical code of conduct that must be adhered to in 
avoiding ‗frivolous suits.‘‖92 
Finally, Sarat and Scheingold have mapped the three 
practice settings inhabited by cause-lawyers.  Chapter four of 
their study, Something to Believe In, finds that most cause-
lawyers (a) work in the pro bono practice of a corporate law 
firm, (b) are salaried lawyers working for a public agency or 
privately-funded advocacy organization, or (c) work in a small 
firm setting devoted to cause lawyering.93  The type of 
organization in which cause-lawyers practice can affect their 
level of commitment, resources, and the strategies they 
employ.   
In the corporate setting, where Peter Evans practices, the 
major advantage for the cause-lawyer is the resources at the 
lawyer‘s disposal, such as billable hour requirements.  
However, these are limited by a firm‘s major function, 
servicing corporate clients, which entails adhering to 
professional responsibility rules regulating conflicts of 
interest.  Positional conflicts (where a pro bono client has an 
interest at odds with the perceived interests of paying, 
corporate clients) particularly act to constrain firm advocacy 
because a firm‘s primary allegiance is to its corporate clients.  
Although this limits the ability of someone practicing in this 
venue to truly ―upset the apple cart,‖ the authors conclude 
corporate practice is a valid and widely employed vehicle for 
legal activism.94 
Salaried staff lawyers and lawyers in firms devoted to 
 
 91. Id. at 266. 
 92. Id. at 269, 271.  They add that most cause lawyers did not pursue litigation 
that had little chance of success because of the actual costs to the movements in which 
they were involved.  Id. at 271.   
 93. SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 77, at 72-95.  For a sustained example 
of cause lawyers operating in a case that involved science, see Margaret Talbot, Darwin 
in the Dock: Intelligent Design has its Day in Court, NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 66.  
This article is also interesting because it depicts ―right-wing‖ cause lawyers, a breed of 
political/legal activist that has only recently emerged.   
 94. SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 77, at 74-80. 
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cause advocacy have many more avenues to pursue their 
agendas of change.  Lawyers working on the staff of an 
organization typically must subsume their personal goals to 
the organizational mission, and the typically lower salaries 
are a trade off from the ―commodified legal services‖ that are 
more typical in corporate practice.95 Cause-oriented small 
firms represent a collegial option where a lawyer can practice 
with like-minded individuals and may have more freedom of 
choice in clients and methods to pursue their goals.96  The 
pressure on this freedom, however, is the need to generate 
enough fee-based business to support the practice.97 
Regardless of the practice setting, all of the Sarat and 
Scheingold research discussed above supports the finding that 
cause-lawyers do not engage in frivolous litigation, nor do 
they use litigation manipulatively for their own ends.  
Litigation is in the service of the cause; the cause is not in the 
service of litigation.  Although some cause-lawyers engage 
politically, other lawyers do engage in ―rule-of-law‖ cause-
lawyering which means giving priority to using the courts and 
litigation to achieve their objectives.  That is, for the legally 
engaged cause-lawyer, ―legality is, in effect, the cause.‖98  
What differs in this setting is that the legal system is used 
more creatively and in more sophisticated ways than is 
conventionally assumed.99  The McCann and Silverstein study 
of lawyers involved in pay equity and animal rights issues 
found that, in contrast to the traditional view, nearly all of 
the attorneys considered ―law, litigation, and legal tactics in a 
skeptical, politically sophisticated manner.”100  Legal tactics 
may be used appropriately only in certain situations: 
For most of our subjects, these ―right‖ uses involved careful 
coordination of litigation and legal advocacy with other tactics and 
resources. . . . In particular, most of our lawyers discussed the ways 
 
 95. Id. at 80-87. 
 96. Id. at 89. 
 97. Id. at 87-94. 
 98. Id. at 18-19. 
 99. Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”: A 
Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE 
LAWYERING, supra note 77, at 262.  They state that the traditional critique of lawyers 
assumes that lawyers favor litigation as a preferred means of change and have an 
overly optimistic view of law‘s transformative power, and are seen as motivated by 
glory, status and prestige. Id. This claim is not borne out by their study. Id. at 261-86. 
 100. Id. at 266 (emphasis in original). 
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in which litigation could be effectively used to bolster efforts for 
constituent education and mobilization, political lobbying, 
negotiation with management, and winning allied support.101 
They conclude: ―[L]egal victories were hardly seen as ends 
in themselves. . . .‖102  The lawyers were constantly aware of 
the ethical constraints on litigation, its many costs, and the 
advantages of other means of dispute resolution.103  Most 
surprisingly, in contrast to Crichton‘s claim that cause-
lawyers ―take over‖ a movement, McCann and Silverstein 
found the opposite: ―[C]ause lawyers did not tend to dominate 
movements or clients, nor did they ignore rank and file 
movement leaders.‖104  In part, the clients‘ suspicions kept 
this in check and also, the lawyers themselves understood 
that they were part of a group, rather than acting 
independently, and needed to work toward connecting with 
clients.105  McCann and Silverstein conclude, ―[t]hus, the 
stereotype of the overly litigious lawyer may be just that: a 
stereotype.‖106  Notably, although Crichton and much of 
popular culture malign lawyers, the social science literature 
paints a different portrait, particularly of cause-lawyers.107 
C. Lawyers, Allied with Media and Politicians, Are Complicit 
in Creating a “State of Fear” Which Makes Intelligent 
Policy Planning in a Deliberative Democracy Impossible. 
1. The Claim 
Many techno-thrillers have at their heart some kind of 
conspiracy that creates an ―us versus them‖ flavor, and State 
of Fear is no different.  It is perhaps better, however, to let 
Crichton directly state his claim that ―social control is best 
 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 269. 
 103. Id. at 269-71. 
 104. Id. at 274 
 105. Id. at 274-76. 
 106. Id. at 277; See also WORLDS, supra note 77, at 10-13. 
 107. See e.g., Chase, supra note 22, at 281 (observing that ―very little has been 
written (by lawyers, law professors, or social scientists) on the images that Americans 
have constructed of law and lawyers as mediated through the institutions of mass 
culture.‖).  His sketch reveals that there are two predominant images: the good, 
virtuous lawyer (think Atticus Finch), versus the negative, power and money hungry 
lawyer. 
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managed through fear[,]‖108 as he does through the character 
of Professor Norman Hoffman, who studies the ecology of 
thought in a dialogue with Peter Evans.  Beginning with the 
premise that every sovereign needs to control the behavior of 
its citizens, Hoffman describes the state of fear induced by the 
environmental crises that now takes the place of the Cold 
War: 
But the military-industrial complex is no longer the primary driver 
of society.  In reality, for the last fifteen years we have been under 
the control of an entirely new complex, far more powerful and far 
more pervasive.  I call it the politico-legal-media complex.  The 
PLM.  And it is dedicated to promoting fear in the population—
under the guise of promoting safety.  [Although Evans 
acknowledges the role of safety, and Hoffman acknowledges 
Western nations are ―fabulously safe‖ he continues.] Yet people do 
not feel they are, because of the PLM.  And the PLM is powerful 
and stable, precisely because it unites so many institutions of 
society.  Politicians need fears to control the population.  Lawyers 
need dangers to litigate, and make money.  The media need scare 
stories to capture an audience.  Together, these three estates are so 
compelling that they can go about their business even if the scare is 
totally groundless.  If it has no basis in fact at all. . . this is the way 
modern society works—by the constant creation of fear.  And there 
is no countervailing force. There is no system of checks and 
balances, no restraint on the perpetual promotion of fear after fear 
after fear. . . .109 
Even after Evans weakly asserts that the freedom of 
speech and of the press may act as limitations, Hoffman 
continues: 
We are talking about a situation that is profoundly immoral.  It is 
disgusting, if truth be told.  The PLM callously ignores the plight of 
the poorest and most desperate human beings on our planet in 
order to keep fat politicians in office, rich news anchors on the air, 
and conniving lawyers in Mercedes-Benz convertibles.  Oh, and 
university professors in Volvos.  Let‘s not forget them.110 
Thus, it is not surprising a few pages later when the media 
display of a speech at a NERF climate conference is 
 
 108. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 454. 
 109. Id. at 456. 
 110. Id. at 454-57.  Crichton states in his author‘s note: ―The current near-hysterical 
preoccupation with safety is at best a waste of resources and a crimp on the human 
spirit, and at worst an invitation to totalitarianism.  Public education is desperately 
needed.‖ Id. at 571.  
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mysteriously changed in anticipation of NERF‘s evil plot to 
create artificial climate disasters.111 
2. Another View 
It is easy to dismiss Crichton‘s construction of the Politico-
legal-media complex  or PLM as little more than a plot device, 
but under closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that it is 
actually an extended case of lawyer-bashing.  While a social 
scientist might be quick to point out the outmoded views of 
politics and culture on which his PLM model rests, the focus 
here will be on whether Crichton correctly points the finger at 
lawyers as the agents creating litigiousness and a society in 
which people measure behavior in units of fear.   
As explained by Professors Michael McCann and William 
Haltom, knowledge about the legal system can be socially 
constructed.  As they note in their introduction, ―We are 
interested in how legal knowledge, and hence law itself, is 
constructed and produced in mass-mediated culture.‖ 112  
Viewed through the perspective of their works, State of Fear 
reveals itself as little more than an extended ―tort tale‖ which 
is part of an American narrative tradition that ―convey[s] 
serious meaning and exercise[s] pervasive interpretive power 
in modern American society. . . . These narratives, we argue, 
are one important component in a powerful tradition of legal 
lore permeating contemporary mass culture.‖113 Nor are these 
―tort tales‖ harmless anecdotes or amusing jokes: ―[T]hese 
pervasive allegations about civil law are but one dimension of 
a larger assault on rights entitlements, legal challenges to 
hierarchy, and democratic appeals to courts that have fueled 
the culture wars in American society over the past several 
decades.‖114 
 
 111. Id. at 462-64.  
 112. WILLIAM HALTOM AND MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, 
MEDIA AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS ix (University of Chicago Press 2004) [hereinafter 
DISTORTING THE LAW]. 
 113.  Id. at 5-6. This is not necessarily a new or original portrait of lawyers. See, e.g., 
Donald Baker, The Lawyer in Popular Fiction, 3 J. POPULAR CULTURE 493, 502 (1969) 
(noting that ―[d]uring the depression era, novelists [depicted] the lawyer . . . as engaged 
in a conspiracy with business and property owners to exploit those less fortunate in 
American society.  The heroes of these novels, certain that they are being cheated and 
robbed by this combination, condemn both the law and lawyers.‖).  
 114. See e.g., DISTORTING THE LAW, supra note 112, at 6 n. 10 (defining ―culture 
war‖ as ―competing visions of the proper relationship between individual responsibility 
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―Tort tales,‖ as they are later defined are ―moralistic 
parables that refocus general dissatisfaction with civil justice 
into particular outrages or injustices‖ and have powerful 
ideological consequences in the values that they convey and 
shape.115  The salient features of ―tort tales‖ that make them 
successful in shaping legal knowledge are their elegance, 
stereotypic characterizations of legal actors and behaviors, 
and the ―holler of the dollar.‖ i.e. the price that immoral 
litigants can exact from society.116  These stories derive their 
power from the fact that they are widely available, 
understandable, memorable, and ultimately uplifting. 117 
This account explains why Crichton‘s story, even while 
ponderous, nonetheless is calculated to appeal to American 
sensibilities.  The stereotypic visions he paints of lawyers, 
embroiling them in a conspiracy to defraud the American 
people, is one that resonates with much of the prevailing 
anecdotal and political discourse.  Yet, Part B of this article 
demonstrates that the opposite is true.  As sketched in that 
section, cause lawyers are servants of causes rather than 
drivers of agendas.  An extensive body of social science 
research, reviewed by Haltom and McCann, points out that in 
―the disputing framework,‖ and  ―[d]espite complaints about 
the role of lawyers in Modern American society, lawyers act 
as gatekeepers who restrict the flow of cases and discourage 
 
and the collective ‗moral community,‘‖ and locate ―education, television, movies, 
newspapers, advertising, etc. as the primary sites of this contest for influence‖ which 
has permeated our official political discourse.). 
 115. Id. at 61. 
 116. Id. at 62. By this characterization, Drake is the classic immoral litigator. 
 117. Id. at 68-70.  Ironically, Haltom and McCann point out the failure of scholarly 
accounts or rebuttals (such as this one) to rebut tort tales because they are not 
published in accessible journals, generally require specialized knowledge to be 
understandable, and because of the demands in professional culture, must be balanced 
and impartial.  Id. at 73-75, 100-09.  As they conclude: 
If we are correct that the reformers‘ assault on excessive litigation represents 
a moral crusade as much or more than an empirical challenge, then normative 
arguments about justice, democracy, and social responsibility define the 
terrain on which the primary political battle must be waged. Scholarly 
dismissals of the ―politics of ideas‖ – as if this politics were somehow impure or 
dishonest –retreats from the challenge of demonstrating how individualistic 
moral frames obscure key issues, how such frames displace concerns about 
power, how norms of responsibility might be applied differently, and a host of 
other possible challenges to neoliberal and neoconservative values. 
Id. at 108. 
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some litigation.‖118  This research demonstrates compellingly 
that most accounts of disputing overlook the role of lawyers as 
winnowers of litigation and, by focusing on trials and other 
highly publicized legal events, miss the invisible data about 
grievances that are resolved by other forms of dispute 
resolution.119  With respect to ―tort tales,‖ even lawyers tend 
not to rebut the depiction of their role or of their cases in the 
popular press. As Haltom and McCann note, a lawyer‘s ability 
to tell ―powerful stories‖ about tort or any other form of 
litigation is constrained by professional ethics and law.120  
Thus, contrary to Crichton‘s assertions, the relative 
inaccessibility of empirically accurate information about the 
operation of the legal system, as well as professional and legal 
constraints against divulging client stories, ultimately leaves 
lawyers at the mercy of the media rather than in collusion 
with them.  This is exacerbated by the institutional 
tendencies of news organizations to gloss over the technical 
aspects of legal stories, and failure to follow cases beyond 
initial filing in the level of detail that would expose the 
nuances of litigation.121  These popular stories, in turn, make 
it easy to believe the worst about lawyers.  The stigma 
attached to lawyers and their use of the legal system 
developed as a result of these stories‘ effect on ―other rights 
based movements‖ like the environmental movement, and 
diminished the legal system‘s clout in the political arena.122  
 
 118. Id. at 80 (drawing heavily on Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of 
Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly 
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983)). 
 119. DISTORTING THE LAW, supra note 112, at 80. Additionally, it is now widely 
accepted that the trial plays a greatly reduced role in dispute resolution. 
 120. Id. at 129.  Their general account of the American Trial Lawyers Association‘s 
reluctance to take on tort tales is told in Chapter 4 of their book.  Much of this 
hesitancy arises from the fact that to fully ―tell‖ the story will require divulging client 
confidences, which is a violation of the professional responsibility rules that prevail in 
most states. 
 121. In Chapters 5 through 8, Haltom and McCann chronicle the lapses in media 
coverage of legal events, and in fact, how the media have been ―captured‖ by purveyors 
of ―tort tales.‖  For example, they describe how ―pop tort reformers‖, who often have a 
better understanding of how media coverage works, inject ―tort tales‖ into media 
coverage.  Id. at 150.  Similarly, they undertake an empirical study to understand how 
civil litigation is (mis)reported in the popular press, partially due to the efforts of tort 
reformers but also because of the institutional limitations of news coverage.  Id. at 155-
74.  Chapter 6 of their account is a detailed, truthful account of the McDonalds ―hot 
coffee‖ litigation. 
 122. Id. at 288.  
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In the end, ―prevailing commonsense lore about the lawsuit 
crisis has impeded sophisticated discourse about the 
complexities of tort law practice, about the most important 
recent developments in those practices, about alternative 
modes of productive legal reform, and about a wide array of 
socially responsible, just, and effective policy options for 
dealing with risks of harm experienced by citizens.‖123 
CONCLUSION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN 
AN AGE OF FEAR  
Crichton‘s book touches a raw nerve in the American 
psyche.  Everywhere one looks, Americans are experiencing 
―fear‖ of something – terrorism, global warming, rising crime.  
―Fear Itself‖ has appeared as a character in the cartoon 
Doonesbury124, and the Washington Post National Weekly 
Edition  ran an article titled ―Fraidy Cat Nation: The Only 
Thing We Have to Fear is the Hype Over Fear Itself.”125 
While the headlines may seem new, there is nothing 
particularly new about dealing with the unknown, the 
uncertain, and the frightening in literature and fiction.  Our 
preoccupation with global warming and other ―scientifically‖ 
induced fears did not start with State of Fear or the global 
warming thriller, The Day After Tomorrow.126  In 1871, Lt. Col. 
George Tomkyns Chesney wrote a story for Blackwood’s 
Magazine titled ―The Battle of Dorking,” recounting an attack 
on the town of Dorking, England in order to shock the British 
 
 123. Id. at 295.  As they further note, it undermines the ability to pursue rights 
based causes in the legal system while at the same time diverting attention away from 
the ―chronic tendency of U.S. political institutions to leave so much for the judiciary to 
do in formulating and administering social policy.‖ Id. 
 124. Gary Trudeau, Doonesbury, Oct. 15, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.com/comics/daily.asp?sFile=db061015 (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
 125. Fraidy Cat Nation: The Only Thing We Have to Fear is the Hype Over Fear 
Itself, WASH. POST NAT‘L WKLY. EDITION, Dec. 12-18, 2005, at 10.  The article reports on 
the rash of headlines that seek to induce fear from a number of causes: ―Terrorism. 
Weapons of mass destruction. Bird flu. Hurricanes. Sex offenders. New and terrible 
forms of cancer. Sexually transmitted diseases. Alzheimer‘s.  Crystal meth labs. 
Lawsuits. Prison breaks! . . . .‖ It concludes: ―The land is in lockdown.‖  The article 
points to Washington D.C. as the nation‘s amygdala, the organ of the brain that 
processes fear, and is capable of processing only one emotion at a time. ―So if you are 
busy fueling your amygdala with fear, the courage, passion, laughter can‘t get in.‖  The 
article then details the ways in which the government and the media have used fear, 
although while it ―may be good for business, . . . it‘s bad for the national psyche.‖  Id. 
 126. THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 2004).  
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government into doing more to prepare for wars in the 
future.127  ―[Y]et reaction to it showed that to the reading 
public the two sensations [shock and entertainment] were 
intertwined.  Chesney had accidentally invented the 
thriller.‖128   
The prevalent theme of thrillers is ―an uneasiness about 
technological change.‖129 Many of Crichton‘s stories have been 
labeled ―techno-thrillers,‖ capturing the combination of 
science and technology as the source of the thrill, and possibly 
our salvation from it.  In this genre, the scientific 
phenomenon itself becomes one of the characters in the story, 
as global warming does in State of Fear.  This is not unusual; 
for example, the aliens and their advanced technology are 
characters in War of the Worlds.130 The characterization of the 
science is essential to the plot. Commenting on another work 
by H.G. Wells, he notes that ―[t]he book‘s main character is 
the nuclear chain reaction itself: a phenomenon portrayed in 
such intimate and creepy detail that it seems almost like a 
living thing.‖131  The point of this literary diversion is that 
stories, whether called ―thrillers‖ or ―literature,‖ have great 
power to animate people.  Arguably, this kind of fiction is 
―essential‖ in a democracy because it can, by a ―careful, 
thoroughly honest search for and analysis of values[,]. . . 
explore[], open-mindedly, to learn what it should teach.‖132 
 
 127. Tom Reiss, Imagining the Worst: How a Literary Genre Anticipated the Modern 
World in THE NEW YORKER 106 (Nov. 28, 2005).  His story spawned a host of imitators, 
of which the most well known, even to this day, is H.G. Wells‘ War of the Worlds 
published in 1898. Id. at 109. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. H.G. WELLS, WAR OF THE WORLDS (Aerie Books1898). 
 131. Id. at 114 (commenting on Wells‘ ―The World Set Free”).  Reiss chronicles how 
Leo Szilard, a physicist, after reading the novel in German, ―conceived how a nuclear 
weapon might actually be built‖ and sent a chapter to Sir Hugo Hirst, the founder of 
British General Electric with a letter in which he wrote ―‗The forecast of the writers 
may prove to be more accurate than the forecast of the scientists.  The physicists have 
conclusive arguments as to why we cannot create at present new sources of energy. . . . 
I am not so sure whether they do no miss the point;‘‖ thus anticipating the development 
of nuclear energy and the atomic revolution.  Id. 
 132. JOHN GARDNER, ON MORAL FICTION 19 (Basic Books, Inc. 1978). Gardner states 
that: ―True art is by its nature moral,‖ although he also notes that we are ―embarrassed 
by this idea,‖ finding it ―unfashionable.‖ Id. at 25.  Gardner defines morality to mean 
―nothing more than doing what is unselfish, helpful, kind and noble-hearted, and doing 
it with at least a reasonable expectation that in the long run as well as the short we 
won‘t be sorry for what we‘ve done, whether or not it was against some petty human 
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Jumping from literature to social science, it is perhaps 
ironic that Cass Sunstein, in Laws of Fear: Beyond the 
Precautionary Principle133 attacks the same principle that 
apparently animated Crichton to write State of Fear.  Both 
men eschew ―the precautionary principle.‖134Sunstein, noting 
that there are myriad formulations of the principle, defines it 
generically as ―the animating idea . . . that regulators should 
take steps to protect against potential harms, even if causal 
chains are unclear and even if we do not know that those 
harms will come to fruition.‖135 At numerous points, Sunstein 
condemns the principle as being ―literally incoherent, . . . it is 
therefore paralyzing; it forbids the very steps it requires.‖136  
Rather than a novel, Sunstein presents his view in a scholarly 
book that is half the size of Crichton‘s novel.  For that reason,  
it is far less likely, as Haltom and McCann point out, to come 
to the notice of the reading public.137 
Regardless, Sunstein‘s careful dissection and rejection of 
the precautionary principle serves to illustrate the book that 
State of Fear could have been if Crichton had been interested 
in writing a ―moral tale‖ rather than a ponderously ideological 
 
law.  Moral action is action which affirms life.‖  Id. at 23.  Read as a whole, Gardner‘s 
work suggests that the moral is the equivalent of agape-like love for the world acted out 
in the character of the hero. 
 133. CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
(Cambridge University Press 2005) [herinafter LAWS OF FEAR]. 
 134. CRICHTON, FEAR, supra note 3, at 571.  ―The ‗precautionary principle,‘ properly 
applied, forbids the precautionary principle.  It is self-contradictory.  The precautionary 
principle therefore cannot be spoken of in terms that are too harsh.‖  Id. 
 135. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133 at 4.  
 136. Id.;  See also id. at 13-14. 
 137.  DISTORTING THE LAW, supra note 112, at 100-09.  Haltom and McCann note 
that most scholarship is ―relatively unknown to journalists and citizens, virtually 
ceding the contest for influence to proponents of familiar common sense‖ because it is 
―relatively inaccessible,‖ because ―the same rigor to which the social scientist proudly 
aspires generally produces tedious impediments for the nonexperts.‖ Id. at 100, 102.  
Calling for scholars ―to connect their powerful debunking efforts to more artful 
narratives‖ they characterize this as a moral battle not just an empirical one. Id. at 
109.  They state ―If we are correct that the reformers‘ assault on excessive litigation 
represents a moral crusade as much or more than an empirical challenge, then 
normative arguments about justice, democracy, and social responsibility define the 
terrain on which the primary political battle must be waged.  Scholarly dismissals of 
the ‗politics of ideas‘ - as if this politics were somehow impure or dishonest - retreats 
from the challenge of demonstrating how individualistic moral frames obscure key 
issues, how such frames displace concerns about power, how norms of responsibility 
might be applied differently, and a host of other possible challenges to neoliberal and 
neoconservative values.‖ Id. at 108. 
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cant.  Sunstein‘s thesis that the ―precautionary principle,‖ 
defined as the principle that in the face of uncertainty and 
doubt about potential hazards, regulators should take steps to 
protect from potential harms even if uncertain about the 
cause and the timeframe in which harm may occur,138 is 
incoherent.  He locates this book in an extended meditation 
on ―fear, democracy, rationality, and the law.‖139  Like 
Crichton, he wants to understand how government and the 
law should respond to public fear, locating the solution in the 
framework of deliberative democracy.140  Along the way, he 
provides useful insights, garnered from social science and 
neuroeconomics, about how human beings construct fear.   
Sunstein outlines a number of theories that seek to 
explain why people, and their governments, have such a 
difficult time regulating in the face of potentially large 
dangers like global warming.  Much of the difficulty is rooted 
in human behavior, and he seeks to explain this by reference 
to several theories.  First, he notes that the ―prospect theory‖ 
explains fear of ―significant harms that have a low probability 
of occurring.‖141 Governments will sometimes follow their 
populace in this regard, and wrongly apply the precautionary 
principle to low-probability risks of serious harm.  This is an 
ill-advised strategy because the precautionary principle does 
not tell us the ―right‖ amount of precaution or what a 
reasonable cost for the precaution might be.  Ultimately, it, 
that is, the precautionary principle, ―forbids all course of 
action, including regulation‖ and he applies this to the cases 
of genetic modification of goods, global warming, nuclear 
power, arsenic in drinking water, and the impact of military 
exercises on marine life.142  Avoidance of these risks can 
impose their own costs, whatever form of regulation is 
undertaken.143 
 
 138. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133, at 4. 
 139. Id. at 1. 
 140. Id. at 1–9.  Sunstein discusses global warming as well as other ―fears,‖ noting 
that the European community has more warmly embraced the precautionary principle 
than has the United States.  Id. at 13–24.  In the course of this discussion, he notes that 
there are ―weak‖ and ―strong‖ versions of the precautionary principle, as well as an 
infinite number of models in between. 
 141. Id. at 26. 
 142. Id. at 26-28. 
 143. It should be noted that unlike Crichton, Sunstein does recognize that ―there is 
general agreement that global warming is in fact occurring‖ although ―[s]cientists are 
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Second, Sunstein points to the ―availability heuristic, 
probability neglect, loss aversion, belief in the benevolence of 
nature, and system neglect‖ to demonstrate how politics can 
exploit these behavioral and cognitive traits to explain how 
the operation of fear and precaution can determine the 
regulations a particular polity might adopt.144  All of these 
devices are ones that all human beings use to deal with the 
incomprehensible, be it global warming or the threat of 
nuclear war.  Briefly explained, the availability of the 
heuristic captures our tendency to ―assess the magnitude of 
risks by asking whether [familiar] examples [or comparisons] 
can come readily to mind.‖145  If so, we are more likely to be 
frightened.  This can be magnified by our familiarity with a 
particular object of fear as well as its salience.  For example, 
seeing a burning house is more frightening than reading 
about it.  What is ―available‖ will vary from culture to culture, 
depending upon the social context of that culture, e.g., its 
media, its government, etc.146 
A third feature of our assessment of risk of harm, 
according to Sunstein, comes from probability neglect.  
Different from the availability heuristic, which can produce 
―inaccurate assessments of probability,‖ probability neglect 
describes our failure to assess probability or likelihood at all, 
especially if a strong emotion is involved.147  Here, Sunstein 
points to global warming as a place where we have focused on 
worst case scenarios and then called for aggressive regulation, 
without necessarily assessing all of the evidence and the 
probabilities in each case.  While in the case of global 
warming, he notes that this reaction may seem ―warranted,‖ 
his point is to demonstrate how our ability to visualize 
imagery about harm matters ―a great deal to people‘s 
reactions to risks.‖148  Images of rising water levels and of 
New York under layers of snow and ice, as depicted in the 
movie Day After Tomorrow,149 can crowd ―out probability 
judgments.‖150  He concludes at this point, ―[i]n many 
 
not in accord about the dangers associated with‖ it. Id. at 27. 
 144. Id. at 35. 
 145. Id. at 36. 
 146. Id. at 36-39. 
 147. Id. at 39. 
 148. Id. at 40. 
 149. DAY AFTER TOMORROW, supra note 126. 
 150. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133 at 40. 
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contexts, the law itself is a response to fear of bad outcomes 
without close attention to the question of probability. . . .‖151   
This lack of attention to probability is compounded by the 
operation of our tendency to be loss averse, and to be more 
comfortable with ―familiar risks [rather] than unfamiliar 
ones, even if they are statistically equivalent.‖152  People are 
more worried about the statistically low probability of a 
terrorist event rather than the higher and statistically 
predictable likelihood of death or injury in a car accident.153  
Finally, Sunstein introduces our completely counterfactual 
belief in the benevolence of nature, i.e. that ―nature implies 
safety‖ and ―system neglect.‖154  The last trait, system neglect, 
is particularly important because it means that ―much of the 
time, people neglect the systemic effect of one-shot 
interventions.‖155  In turn, people tend to forget or ignore that 
changing one part of a system will affect the other parts, and 
that ―people fail to see the frequent need to weigh competing 
variables against one another.‖156 
The blind application of the precautionary principle, in the 
face of these human characteristics, means that we tend to 
take drastic precautions against something that may well be 
statistically rare, and empirically unstudied without 
understanding how to evaluate whether a ―drastic,‖ rather 
than ―small, reversible‖ intervention, may be the better 
precautionary approach. 
One of Sunstein‘s reactions to this quandary is to suggest 
that the precautionary principle, acting alone and in the face 
of these human characteristics, does not provide a ―sensible 
 
 151. Id. at 39-41.  Sunstein undertakes a sustained analysis of probability neglect 
and its relation to fear, noting that people often ignore probability in the face of strong 
emotions such as fear.  Id. at 67-88.  This may lead regulators to engage ―in extensive 
regulation precisely because intense emotional reactions are making people relatively 
insensitive to the (low) probability that dangers will ever come to fruition.‖ Id. at 69.  
Similarly, he notes that many people cannot evaluate low probabilities of risk, and thus 
ignore the difference between ―1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000.‖ Id. at 73. 
 152. Id. at 42. 
 153. Id. at 43. 
 154. In this sense, Crichton and Sunstein agree that the belief that nature is 
benevolent may be ill-founded; in fact, they would probably agree that the opposite is 
true – at times, nature is sinister. 
 155. Id. at 45. 
 156. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133, at 44-46.  This last variant of system neglect he 
calls ―tradeoff neglect.‖  
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basis for structuring democratic discussion.‖157  In order for 
deliberative democracy to make intelligent precautionary 
choices, there needs to be more information, and ―uncertainty 
and irreversibility should lead to a sequential decision-
making process.‖158  In this regard, he points to global 
warming as an example, stating that the precautionary 
principle has caused us to go ―all out‖ without assessing the 
losses or costs to certain avenues of regulation.159  As we make 
our way to an informed response to risk, Sunstein notes, 
echoing Mill, that an honest appraisal of the likelihood of 
harm should diminish the danger of interest-group 
manipulation because he deems public alarm a harm of its 
own.160  Thus, a ―sensible approach to risk‖ will address public 
fear, even if baseless.161  
By the end, in addition to proposing an alternate to the 
precautionary principle, Sunstein also discusses the role of 
the media and government to address risk in the face of these 
embedded human characteristics. Government, most likely 
because it is the collection of citizens acting under conditions 
of imposed rationality, can ―permit deliberation‖ and ―do a lot 
better‖ than, say, the ordinary person confronted with an 
emergency.162 He acknowledges that ―it should be clear that 
news sources do a great deal to trigger fear, simply by offering 
examples of situations in which the ‗worst case‘ has actually 
come to fruition.‖163  But unlike Crichton, this is not the 
product of some great conspiracy, but rather that the media 
suffer from the same availability heuristic and probability 
 
 157. Id. at 55. 
 158. Id. at 59.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 63. 
 161. Id. at 63. Contrast, however, what Gardner has to say about a belief in free 
speech and the war of ideas: ―But. . . what we generally get in our books and films is 
bad instruction. . . .‖  The Jeffersonian ideal that truth will emerge, in his reckoning, is 
an empty theory that ―lie[s] then, in an excessively timid idea of democracy.‖  GARDNER, 
supra note 132, at 42. 
 162. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133, at 87.  
 163. Id. at 88. See also id. at 102 (―[I]n the real world, some voices are more 
important than others, especially when availability and salience are involved.  In 
particular, the behavior and preoccupations of the media play a large role.  Many 
perceived ‗epidemics‘ are in reality no such thing, but instead a product of media 
coverage of gripping, unrepresentative incidents.‖  Thus, rather than attributing media 
coverage of these events to the ―PLM,‖ he notes that ―media‘s coverage reflects its 
economic self-interest‖ to attract attention and boost ratings.) 
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neglect as do most citizens.  In this sense, government and 
institutions like the media can matter: ―A deliberative 
democracy would attempt to create institutions that have a 
degree of immunity from short-term public alarm.‖164  In the 
end, reminiscent of John Dewey and Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Sunstein states what we ought to do: 
If we are committed to a deliberative conception of 
democracy, we will be neither populists nor technocrats.  Law 
and policy ought not to reflect people‘s blunders; democracies 
should not mechanically follow citizens‘ fears, or for that 
matter their fearlessness.  Nor does anything here suggest the 
virtues of rule by a technocratic elite.  As I have suggested, 
citizens make qualitative distinctions among quantitatively 
identical risks, and when their reflective values account for 
those qualitative distinctions, the judgments of the citizens 
deserve respect.‖165 
As he moves to create an anti-catastrophe principle that 
recognizes both the role of economics, cost-benefit and a 
Rawlsian assessment of values that may dictate a particular 
outcome regardless of the cost, Sunstein suggests that in a 
deliberative democracy the government will need to do a 
better job of educating the populace about risks and disclosing 
information about them.166  ―At a minimum, any disclosure, if 
it is worthwhile, should be accompanied by efforts to enable 
people to put the risk in context.‖167  For Sunstein, this 
 
 164. Id. at 88.  Some recent commentators, including Crichton, suggested that this 
may not be true of our government in recent years.  See Michael Spector, Political 
Science: The Bush Administration’s War on the Laboratory,” NEW YORKER, Mar. 13, 
2006, at 58.  The relation between the scientific community and the political one 
matters deeply: ―Science largely dictated the political realities of the twentieth 
century.‖ Id. at 61.  Says one scientist in response to the Bush administration‘s efforts 
to politicize science, ―You can‘t do science without understanding that theories are 
public and views often clash.  You resolve differences by experiments and research, not 
by toeing the line.‖ Id. at 62.  In the example of whether the government should begin 
needle exchange to prevent HIV transmission, which both Clinton and Bush opposed, 
another scientist said, importantly, ―As a scientist, the answer has to be I believe in the 
data. . . . Asking the question ‗Do you believe in needle exchange?‘ is a real violation of 
science.  It so happens that needle exchange is a good public-health measure.  And we 
need also to understand that there are issues in society that will trump scientific 
information.  For many people, this is one of them.  That is a political decision, and I 
have no problem with politicians making it.  But that is a terribly unfair question to put 
to a scientist.‖ Id. at 64.  
 165. LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 133, at 105-06.  
 166. Id. at 124. 
 167. Id.  
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approach means that ―[g]overnment ought to treat its citizens 
with respect‖ and not ―manipulate‖ what we now know about 
creating fear.168  But recognizing that this fear may 
sometimes be inescapable, he states that the government 
should reject regulation when ―there is no good reason for it,‖ 
and that such a government will ―suggest[] the importance of 
ensuring a large role for specialists in the regulator 
process.‖169  That said, however, he is direct in saying that 
―[n]othing in a cost-benefit analysis can solve the evaluative 
questions.‖170  Therefore, in a deliberative democracy, 
regulatory choices should be made after a debate about 
preferences and values.  ―I have suggested that a good 
constitutional system is a deliberative democracy, not a 
maximization machine.  Many social judgments should be 
made by citizens engaged in deliberative discussion with one 
another rather than by aggregating the individual choices of 
consumers.‖171  This is because for some targets of regulation, 
e.g. sexual harassment or endangered species, the choice is 
ultimately an informed value choice rather than an economic 
one.172  After suggesting that libertarian paternalism may be 
an approach government takes to regulation, Sunstein 
concludes: 
Fear is an ineradicable part of human life.  Often it points us in the 
right directions.  Nations, no less than individuals, pay attention to 
it.  But in democratic societies, governments do not capitulate to 
the fears of their citizens, or pretend that a general idea of 
precaution can provide helpful guidance.  Democratic governments 
care about facts as well as fears.  Because they respect liberty and 
self-government, and because they want to improve human lives, 
they listen closely to what people have to say.  But for the same 
reasons, they take careful steps to ensure that laws and policies 
reduce, and do not replicate, the errors to which fearful people are 
prone.173 
 
 168. Id. at 125. 
 169. Id. at 126.  
 170. Id. at 131.  
 171. Id. at 158. 
 172. Id.  He addresses global warming, noting ―There is no good a-contextual way of 
calculating the aggregate costs of global climate change by 2050; actually that is a 
ludicrous question, because it does not have any point.‖  Id. at 171-74.  A far more 
sensible question is whether it would make sense for any particular nation to accept a 
particular way of responding to the problem, such as the Kyoto protocol.‖  Id. at 171. 
 173. Id. at 226. 
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Annihilation, whether it be at the hands of nuclear 
weapons, toxic bacteria or global warming, is terrifying, and 
for that reason can make great fiction. In the case of State of 
Fear, Crichton could have advanced the discussion about the 
role of government, law, science and the media in responding 
to global warming by also creating a moral fiction.  Above, I 
have demonstrated that lawyers are not part of a conspiracy 
to usurp the right of citizens to make informed choices about 
global warming policy.  In fact, the opposite is true.  Working 
as cause-lawyers, and hopefully gaining a greater knowledge 
of science, they help to further our deliberation about policy.  
As much as Crichton lambastes trial lawyers, it may be that 
the now rare trial provides another forum for our discussions.  
Consider this comment about one of the intelligent design 
trials: 
The trial also allowed the lawyers to act as proxies for the rest of 
us, and ask of scientists questions that we‘d probably be too 
embarrassed to ask ourselves.  In a courtroom, you must lay an 
intellectual foundation in order to earn a line of questioning—and 
so the lawyers stripped matters neatly back to the first principles of 
science.  Considering how often it is said that evolution is ‗just‘ a 
theory, for instance, it is clear that many people either do not know 
or do not accept the scientific definition of a theory.  The lawyers 
for the pro-evolution side went to great lengths to make the point 
that, although all science is provisional, a scientific theory is a 
powerful explanation that unites a large body of facts and relies on 
testable hypotheses.  As Padian testified, it is not ‗something that 
we think of in the middle of the night after too much coffee and not 
enough sleep.174 
As John Gardner points out, a book of moral fiction that 
attempts to create true heroes and wrestles with impossible 
human dilemmas is its own experiment.  ―True art imitates 
nature‘s total process: endless blind experiment. . . and then 
ruthless selectivity.  Art, in sworn opposition to chaos, 
discovers by its process what it can say.  That is art‘s 
morality.‖175  It is not surprising that where the ―characters 
are stick figure - cartoons of good and evil - and where plot is 
kept minimal and controlled by message, not by the 
developing will of life like human beings‖ that Crichton fails 
 
 174. Margaret Talbot, Darwin in the Dock: Intelligent Design has its Day in Court, 
NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 66, 68. 
 175. GARDNER, supra note 132, at 14. 
VAUGHN_FORMATTED 2/15/2010  10:40 AM 
84 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 20.1 
us by allowing the characters, within their character, to 
confront the reality of being a lawyer for a cause such as the 
environment.176  Crichton fails all of his characters, which 
―exist for the sake of the predetermined message, not as 
subjects for the artist‘s open-minded exploration of what he 
can honestly say.‖177  And in so doing, he fails us all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 85.  He later notes that discoveries are made while asking whether a 
character would do that, a question that Crichton fails repeatedly to ask.  Id. at 109.  
The test of the theory would be in ―lifelike situations‖ that create the suspense of the 
novel [rather than technological feats], because ultimately fiction ―deals in 
understanding, not knowledge.‖ Id. at 114, 135. 
